AAR 12

The Battle of Kanev was one of the most significant battles of World War II. During 7-13 February 2000 Major Panzeri's USMA Prep Military History class conducted a simulated campaign based on the battle. The exercise provided a clear analysis of the importance of the battle, and the confusion that ensued in the planning and operational phases. I originally assumed the role of the G3 (Operations Officer) for the 8th Airborne Corps, and then as the corps commander due to the commander's absence during the execution phase of the airborne operation. This essay is an after action review written as if I was actually the corps commander writing an authentic account of what happened during the airborne assault of the Kanev campaign.

My name is Major General Ivan Zdebovtsky, and I served as the G3, and temporary commander of Russia's 8th Airborne Corps during the Kanev campaign of 1943. A brief synopsis of the events leading up to the Kanev campaign is simple. The Germans, following their offensive failure at Kursk, were retreating west towards the Dnepr River. The Germans' objective was to cross the river, and form a defensive line that would deny our comrades further progress in retaking territory that belongs to the motherland. Our overall objective was simple - deny the Germans this capability. The role the 8th Airborne would play in this attack was undetermined at first. The 8th Airborne Corps consists of three brigades, and each brigade consists of three battalions. The Corps also has assets of its own, which include a mortar regiment and an anti-tank battalion. On 20 SEP 1943 one battalion parachuted into Rhishischev, and one into Kanev, to prompt a German response and to assess possible German strengths on the west side of the Dnepr. The battalion sent into Rhishischev suffered one hundred percent casualties when they came into contact with a recon battalion of the 19th Panzer Division, and the battalion sent into Kanev lost two companies in fighting undetermined German forces. The results of these jumps revealed very little information, only that there were definitely Germans in vicinity of Kanev and Rhishischev.

The Corps staff came up with three possible courses of action (COA) for the Airborne in support of the campaign. COA Mars planned for conducting an airborne assault with two brigades on the Kanev bridgehead. There were two options for this assault, the first called for a jump onto the west bank of the river, and the second called for jumping onto the east bank. Due to the small size of both potential drop zones, the casualty rates from the jump would be very high, especially in poor weather conditions. Both plans required the two brigades to capture the Kanev bridgehead and hold it at all costs. COA Saturn required one brigade to conduct an airborne assault at Kanev, while the other brigade jumped into Rhishischev. The brigade at Kanev would be faced with the same mission, and the brigade at Rhishischev would seize the nearby river crossing. The drop zone at Rhishischev was also very small, and high casualty rates from the jump were to be expected. COA Marturn called for a two brigade airborne assault in vicinity of the towns Tulinzy-Potapzy. The mission for Marturn would be to prevent the Germans from combining their forces on the west bank of the Dnepr, and to seize the Kanev bridgehead if possible. The drop zone near Tulinzy-Potapzy was wide, open flat, terrain; it was also vacant of any German forces. The casualty rates for the jump would remain minimal as long as there were no German forces of the area. The Soviet commander chose COA Marturn for many reasons, but the most important reason concerning the 8th Airborne Corps is the low casualty rate expected on the airborne assault phase of Operation Marturn.

The execution of the Airborne phase of Operation Marturn went extremely well, certainly much better than many expected. The majority of the paratroopers landed close to each other, and rapidly assembled. The only losses were two submachine gun companies, one anti tank gun, and one 120MM mortar. Upon assembly the Airborne quickly moved up to a position southwest of the Kanev bridge and held until further forces arrived. When the Russian 3rd Guards Tank Army began to move towards the Kanev Bridge, the Airborne attacked the German forces holding the west bank. By effectively pinching the German forces at the Kanev bridgehead, we easily defeated the German forces. The successful delivery of the airborne assets allowed our forces to attack the Germans from two directions, thereby dividing their defenses of the Kanev bridgehead. Without the successful delivery of the Airborne, the Germans would have been able to focus their defenses in one direction, and victory would have come at a higher price.

Many lessons were learned from the airborne phase of Operation Marturn and the Kanev campaign. The first one is that all possible contingencies should be considered and planned for. For example, the loss of headquarters' elements and heavy weapons on the airborne assault should have been taken into consideration when planning. A backup plan for how the mission should be conducted without these elements should have been prepared prior to the execution of the assault. The Kanev operation demonstrated the organizational skills, teamwork, and willingness to take leadership requirements for an airborne operation to be successful. If any member of the Corps staff had been lacking in any of these areas the mission would have undoubtedly been a failure.

The main lesson learned is that airborne operations are only effective if high casualty rates do not occur on the airborne assault. If the Airborne force had been dropped onto Kanev or Rhishischev, well over half of the paratroopers would have perished on the airborne assault alone, and any follow on missions would have been near impossible to complete. Operation Marturn demonstrated the high rate of success Airborne forces might achieve behind enemy lines, if inserted without high casualties from a jump. The overall success of this operation establishes the powerful capability of airborne tactics, and gives clear guidance for planning future airborne operations.