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Borodino 1812


"The Great Redoubt" Issue #6

The Official Journal of Borodino 2002


Issue #6 Editor: Charley Elsden

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EDITORIAL #6

The ancestral English village of my people, Elsdon, is in Northumbria, just below the Scottish Border (for a few historical references see The Border Reivers: The Story of the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands published by Osprey). A surviving medieval ballad hinting at the place's lack of hospitality toward foreigners back in those days reads in part:

If the Frenchers come to Elsdon
Just give them Elsdon fare
By Gawd--they'll quickly hook it off
And never come no mair

In this issue we look at some of the political, diplomatic, and economic relations between England, France, and Russia, especially in the Baltic, in the time previous to and during our Napoleonic period. We also look at that controversial figure Tallyrand, Napoleon's Minister of State, who first represented and then tried to betray him, especially to the Czar. Finally, In The Tavern, we'll look at some contemporary English satire of Czar Paul, Alexander's father, and some interesting early contacts between England, and Russia.

I hope you enjoy this look at the Northern World of Europe in Napoleonic times.

SHRINKING NAPOLEON DOWN TO SIZE: The Russo-French Political & Diplomatic Perspective

"Yeah, that's right, soldier. What I want is... more!"
--Edward G. Robinson to Humprey Bogart, Key Largo

We can't shrink Napoleon physically, of course, any more than God has already-- or the ol' BBD (Bad Blue Dwarf) would disappear entirely! But from a psychological 'shrinking' perspective, historians have commented on his genius in diplomacy, as well as in military strategy. And in fact, it seems to this unbiased writer that the failure of his career in both fields was psychologically karmic. The history of his diplomatic relations with Russia held parallels with what came both before and after him in the history of relations between the West and Russia, our beloved Mean Green Machine (or MGM, if you will; blue and green being respectively the base Napoleonic uniform colors of each side.

Russia exploded onto the European scene in the early eighteenth century. Previously, French diplomatic thinking had been to balance the "eastern marchlands" of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey against the threatening might of the Habsburg Empire (the Austro-German and Spanish holdings combined). Emerging victorious after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), France and the rest of Europe were surprised to find an obscure semi-medieval, semi-Asian Duchy suddenly grown to be a new imperialistic empire, on the edge of Europe to the east -- the Russia of Peter the Great. And just as things exotically Russian became the rage in popular culture, fear of the "backward Empire of noble savages" clutched the hearts of European diplomats--in a way we modern 21st Century citizens who remember the Cold War can well understand. Russians: they're mean... they're green... they're coming to a neighborhood near you! The last time I played Napoleon in a multi-player strategical board game, my first guiding principle was STAY AWAY FROM THE RUSSIANS! And hey, I almost won.

Czar Peter well understood the thinking of the European leaders of his day. Famous as the primary "Europeanizer" of Russia, he traveled to France and made that government an astounding offer. He proposed to ally with France, replacing the smaller eastern states. The French government turned him down, not wanting to see their smaller allies gobbled up by Peter himself (this diplomatic dance was seen once more just before World War II).

When Napoleon took power, he was alternately fascinated by and furious at Russia. On the one hand, Russia was powerful enough to be a great ally, and split Europe with him (including the Eastern Mediterranean). Russia was not vulnerable to English sea power and that arch enemy's diplomatic pressure. Yet Russia was big, dangerous, and expansive. Russia held part of Poland, and was dismembering Turkey as quickly as it could. If Russia got control of the Dardanelles, there might be no border that would satisfy her! Bonaparte went through a number of evolutions with the Czar, alternately warring on and allying with him.

Just before the 1812 campaign, he sought the Czar's sister in marriage! Some say he was traumatized by being put off. He turned then to marriage with an Austrian. Did he ever think he could "conquer" Russia permanently? Probably not. But he could teach the Czar a lesson, and compel alliance through a military campaign. Hadn't he already used this policy successfully with Austria, Prussia, and many smaller European states?

Napoleon was greatly feared by everyone. He was a Revolutionary, a disturber of the peace. The Corsican general's attitude toward life can be best understood by contrasting it with his bete noir Tallyrand, who was to be both his loyal foreign minister and his traitorous enemy. Bonaparte knew no boundaries to his ambition. He compared himself to men of destiny like Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. Tallyrand wanted to make money and live well. Napoleon wanted a new world order, with himself at its head. Tallyrand, like most other leading statesmen of the age, distrusted ideology, fanaticism, and mysticism. He wanted peace and stability--how better to enjoy being one of the privileged elite of European society?

At first, Tallyrand tried to mollify his master. Then later, discovering that the man couldn't be dealt with reasonably, the diplomat worked to undermine Napoleon from within his own government! In the French Emperor's diplomacy with Russia, this played out. Bonaparte, when he offered alliance with Russia, was either dishonest or outright in refusal of Russia's political aims, while ready to reap major benefits from an alliance for France. Did he really think another great state would join with him just for the "glory" of being on his side? This was not the rational international calculation of "realpolitik." This view anticipates that each nation will be guided by its own self interest. In this manner, Bonaparte had lost contact with reality. There was no dealing with him as an equal, even if one wanted to do so. This is why he ended up having to conquer a peace, over and over again. And this is why he ended up having to put his own relatives in power everywhere ("I only trust me and you, and I'm not so sure about you"). The Czar became disillusioned with the Frenchman.

Tallyrand could never pin Napoleon down to any final goal of his foreign policy--because there wasn't one. Hence all attempts to work out a new world order failed. Some concluded that the French Emperor was literally trying to conquer the entire 'world' of Europe, and recreate the Roman Empire geographically. This must be taken into account, in order to understand the fear and hatred he evoked among others. The Corsican appeared to them as a naked, untamable ego. So his brilliance and talent made no difference. He really was Satan--in a psychological sense! And the only kind of deal that could be made with him was a Bargain With the Devil, which swindles you while helping him. (For one illustration of this contemporary view, see our Ramblings In The Tavern column below).

How could "civilized" Europeans look to ally with the backward regime of the Czar? Was it purely a matter of convenience, such as the West's World War II alliance with Stalin? Perhaps not. Although Napoleon published in 1812 the infamous and probably forged "Testament of Peter," which supposedly showed how the Czars since Peter the Great had always been conspiring to conquer all of Europe, Alexander and even his father Paul were moral men according to their own lights, who actually supported the monarchical system which was the normal reality of Europe. They did not want to depose and replace everyone. They had visions of peace, and how it could be created without changing all of the governments of the day. Even compared to the rulers of "primitive" Russia, it was the Corsican who was in truth the Wild Beast of the time!

THE BALTIC TRADE: RUSSIA, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE

Many Napoleonic era buffs who know about the importance of the Mediterranean Sea in the conflicts of the time may not realize the equal and perhaps even greater importance of the Baltic. A brief overview includes the weaving of many interesting threads. For example, did you know that:

  • Catherine the Great "won" the American Revolution!
  • Britain was perhaps the most deforested nation of the time!
  • Part of Napoleon's army marched into Russia wearing uniforms of cloth made in... Great Britain!
  • Britain's greatest periods of economic danger from "The Continental System" were in 1800 and in 1812!
  • The famous naval battle of Copenhagen was originally supposed to be The Battle of Kronstadt instead!

Truly Amazing Facts! But how did they come about?

In our Ramblings In The Tavern article, we trace the first contacts between Europe--mostly Britain and Austria--and Russia, from Peter the Great to 1812. Britain was in early with its Muscovy Company for trade. She had two important needs from this northern nexus--grain and naval stores. So sensitive was she to the northern trade, that Catherine the Great's pressure from the League of Armed Neutrality had a major influence on England's decision to let the American colonies go (we ex-colonials later sent her John Paul Jones to whip her navy into shape). Meanwhile, Britain's huge appetite for timber in ship building led to that nation becoming perhaps the most deforested nation of the time.

Why grain? Huge population growth and bad weather. Several successive poor harvests led to a disastrous diminution of the British domestic grain supply. Riots broke out in many parts of the country, as some blamed speculative conspiring merchants for artificially restricting the supply! But in fact, the supply was significantly reduced. In Ireland for example, so difficult were the conditions and unrest, that after Lord Cornwallis stepped down as Governor General, he was asked who would be able to govern the country in future, and replied "Bonaparte."

Why naval stores? Timber, especially for masts to put the tall in the "tall ships", pitch, turpentine, and related items were essential for the Royal Navy. And the Royal Navy was essential to Britain's control of the seas, on which her overseas empire depended. The very basic direction and developmental thrust of the British Empire was shaped by her naval resource requirements, as her and other later navies would become dependent on coaling stations around the world, and even later on oil resources.

Worst in 1800 but also in 1812, Napoleon's Continental System of economic blockade against Great Britain was more dangerous to her than many realize, according to various historians. Britain learned her lesson from the earlier and more desperate 1800 situation, and by 1812 not only was allied with Russia, but had expanded trade or created new markets in the fledgling USA and in South America (hooray for the British Navy, er, I mean The Monroe Doctrine).

From the British point of view, the naval blockade against Napoleon was about reducing supplies being shipped to the enemy. For Bonaparte, however, his "Continental System" was not so much about reducing supplies to Britain, but about cutting off markets for British exports. Britain's unique economic sophistication was also her Achilles heel. Dependent on selling, as well as buying, the denial of many markets in Europe led Britain to develop trade with French and Spanish colonies, and the US.

But there were many "holes" in the competing trading policies. For example, although Napoleon strictly forbade his allies trading with Britain, he himself issued licenses for cloth merchants to get the materials he needed to supply... his own army! The British, being the naval carriers, often interpreted the search and seizure policies against neutral ships to their own advantage, based on their military naval monopoly. They extended the right to search ships even to armed convoy escorts. Convoys were a modern idea just being born at the time. Convoy escorts, so famous to us in later times as heroic British greyhounds of the seas, were first developed to protect the merchant vessels of smaller naval nations from British naval interference. Related issues tangled the USA up with the British in the War of 1812, as they had almost led us to warring against France previously.

In the Baltic, the famous battle coined the military phrase "to Copenhagen," meaning to sink a fleet in her harbor--in the original case, the Danish fleet. But this was not as clear cut a policy, or a victory, as one would think. History could have been quite different. Because the famous Nelson had just been made a mere Vice Admiral, he did not have the rank to command the fleet at the time. He therefore served under the much more cautious Parker, who trimmed his sails according to prevailing international politics. Most typical of Nelson's unusually vigor, when the British fleet was preparing to sail, someone (most likely the young Nelson) "informed" on Parker to the government, when Parker planned to delay his fleet's sailing to party with his new wife! The Admiral commanding was quickly ordered to heave to immediately!

Now underway, the impetuous Nelson wanted to sink the Russian fleet, half of which was vulnerable, in harbor at Kronstadt. But then the Russians made friendly diplomatic overtures, and Parker refused to sanction such an attack. He also then almost refused to enter Copenhagen harbor, whose dangerous approach channel had been unmarked by the Danes. In fact, in the middle of the battle Parker pulled his own ships out, and signaled Nelson to withdraw as well. Nelson put his telescope to his blind eye and said "I don't see any signal." Yes, it was one of the first occasions of the old "Sorry, your message garbled in transmission" ploy! Nelson then went on to destroy the Danish fleet, which as an enemy, had threatened to combine with the Russian ships and drive the British out of the Baltic for good.

For Russia, the trade was less vital, which is why she really held the whip hand. Czar Peter's "Europeanization" of Russia created a desire for the products of Europe among his nobles for fancy finished goods. So if we discount this luxury trade--but then, we can hardly discount the desire of the ruling class of the country, now can we? Russia didn't really need to trade with Britain the way that country needed the product of Russia and other Baltic nations such as Scandanavia, Prussia, and the Russian ruled Polish areas. But even when these smaller nations were allied with Napoleon against Britain, it still required Russia to create another effective League of Armed Neutrality to hold the British in check. For Russia had a Baltic fleet, and France did not!

RAMBLINGS IN THE TAVERN: ON JOYFUL NOISE IN TIMES GONE BY

Welcome back to the tavern, where the lights are low, the music bright, and the drinks ever flowing. The roots of the Napoleonic conflict are interesting to view in the previous history of Europe's contacts with Russia. In keeping with our theme of diplomacy and international "public relations" this issue, here is how a contemporary British satirical song speaks of Czar Paul's diplomatic flirtation with Napoleon:

CRAZY PAUL
(A New Ballad--to the tune of Crazy Jane; London, 1801)

Why, fair Isle, in every Sailor
Are such signs of rage express'd
Can a moonstruck Russian ruler
Draw the fleet of France from Brest?
Do you dread my late embargoes,
Trust me soon my power will fall,
Man your vessels, ship your cargoes,
Fear no harm from Crazy Paul!

Do you mock my fierce defiance,
Act like me--'tis glorious fun,
Search the globe round for alliance,
League with all--adhere to none;
Once for thee I fought courageous,
(Twas a lucid interval)
But a Gallic pest contagious
Stole the wits of Crazy Paul!

Malta's Isle your fleet blockaded,
Martin's skill (?) each pass secures,
Silly I, by France persuaded,
Thought it mine--but found it yours!
Little Paul, no more Grand Master,
Mad with baby rage I bawl,
Malta fell--but how much faster
Fled the faith of Crazy Paul.

Now for Gallia's course right hearty,
Fickle as the passing air,
Led about by Bonaparte,
Growling like a dancing bear.
How I shame the sons of Russia
While intent to work my fall,
Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia
Cry, come help us, Crazy Paul!

A cartoon facing these lyrics in the original manuscript shows Napoleon with a stick, leading the "Russian Bear" on a chain! Now Czar Paul was Alexander's father, and Catherine's son. Catherine, imperialist and voluptuary, had kept Paul out of power and under surveillance. "For Catherine, Paul harbored a kind of cosmic sense of injury and grievance. Whatever she stood for, he fervently repudiated." (Detente In The Napoleonic Era: Bonaparte and the Russians by Hugh Ragsdale, p. 111; the volume from which most of this information is taken).

The song lyrics refer to Malta. Paul had been "elected" Grand Master of the Knights of St. John (Hospitaliers--a Catholic order!), and considered himself their protector. The French had snatched up the island on their way to Egypt. Paul also unsuccessfully tried to protect small states such as Naples from Napoleon's insatiable appetite. For the only time in history, Czar Paul actually allied Russia with Turkey to throw the French out of the Ionian Islands! Crazy? No, sounds like a guy who could 'think outside the box!'

Here's another bizarre incident from his reign. In 1799 Russian troops were wintering in--the Channel Islands! Czar Paul, like his son Alexander after him, did quite a dance with Napoleon, trying to achieve some level of rapprochement with the Corsican, yet willing to fight if necessary. Paul was in fact a Romantic, hoping to remake Europe into a stable, preferably religious mode. This was not to be. Unfortunately, Paul was perhaps as far from truly understanding Napoleon and the early Nineteenth Century as Tallyrand was a very symbol of its contemporary sensibility. Neither Czar in their most expansionist moods, either Paul or Alexander, had Bonaparte's need to "Conquer The World."

The Austrians were perhaps the first to "discover" Russia in modern times. Late in the Fifteenth Century, a traveling German knight reported that there was a Slavic kingdom east of Poland! The first travelogue/statesman's guide was Notes On Russia by distinguished diplomat Sigismund von Herberstein (1549). Attempts to form an anti-Polish alliance with Russia failed. Later, when an anti-Turkish alliance was desired by Austria and the Pope in the latter sixteenth and much of the seventeenth centuries, Russia was too concerned about Poland! By the time Peter was looking to become more involved with Europe, the Hapsburgs were busy with the War of the Spanish Succession (1700-13). (Note: For Peter's diplomatic initiative to France, see the above article on The Baltic Trade). Peter managed to ally with Vienna for the War of the Polish Succession (1733-35). Internal intrigues kept Russia diplomatically weak during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) and conflicts with Frederick the Great of Prussia. Peter's successor Catherine liked to ally with Frederick's Prussia. Then the French Revolution itself stopped Austrian/Russian plans to dismember Turkey altogether!

England also "discovered" Russia earlier than the French, as we said at the outset. In 1533 one Richard Chancellor appeared at the court of Ivan IV searching for a Northwest passage to China! Soon the English Muscovy Company had a favored place in the Russian market. The first literary reference to Russia in English shows the fanciful picture of the exotic faraway land then held by the English:

KING: How madam? Russians?
PRINCESS: Ay, in truth my lord; trim gallants, full of courtship and of state.
--Love's Labor Lost (5.2. 363-4), by a certain William Shakespeare, (doubtless some obscure fellow back home).

Finally, English Ambassador George Turberville wrote at the time this letter in verse:

I left my native soile, full like a retchlesse man,
And unacquainted of the coast, among the Russes ran:
A people passing rude, to vices vile inclinde,
Folke fit to be of Bacchus traine, so quaffing is their kinde.
Drink is their whole desire, the pot is all their pride,
The sobrest head doth once a day stand needfull of a guide.

The cold is rare, the people rude, the prince so full of pride,
The Realme so stored with Monks and nunnes, and priests on every side:
The manners are so Turkie like, the men so full of guile,
The women wanton, Temples stuft with idols that defile
The Seats that sacred ought to be, the customes are so quaint,
As if I would describe the whole, I fear my pen would faint.
In summe, I say I never saw a prince that so did raigne,
Nor people so beset with Saints, yet all but vile and vain...
If thou be wise, so wise thou art, and wilt be ruld by me,
Live still at home, and covet not those barbrous coasts to see,

Loe thus I make an ende: none other newes to thee,
But that the countrey is too cold, the people beastly bee.

Such was the land, settled by Slavs and later reorganized by Vikings, which forced itself onto the European scene in early modern history. Ironically, it was this strange and savage land, so different from Eighteenth Century "modern" Europe, which was to prove the downfall of Napoleon, that most modern of conquering types! A thought to reflect upon, while sitting snug and warm, here in our tavern.

Borodino'02

 
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