AAR 11

From: Count Kutaisov (Donald F. Hawker)

To General Benningsen
Chief of Staff

Sir,

It is my pleasure to submit this after action report subsequent to recent events occurring in and around the village of Borodino.

Having the honor of commanding the combined reserve artillery, I was afforded the opportunity of viewing the battle as it unfolded at all points.

On our right flank, the performance of our Cossack cavalry was all that could have been hoped. Their magnificent performance under General Karpov rendered the far northern flank of our forces secure, and indeed threatened the enemy rear areas and line of communications.

Slightly farther south, in the area directly east of the Village of Borodino, our forces were more heavily engaged. Though no requests for artillery reinforcement were made during the morning hours, I judged it prudent to forward position a single brigade, consisting of two light batteries and a single heavy battery. These batteries were subsequently deployed in the early afternoon. Though not directly assaulted, they were placed so as to provide supporting fire to the Great Redoubt.

Surprisingly, the Great Redoubt was itself heavily assaulted. Considering the difficult nature of this terrain, and the strong position of our forces, I did not consider the area to require close support from the artillery reserve. However, responding to an urgent request from Prince Bagration, commander of the 2nd Army of the West, I directed a brigade of guns, again consisting of two light and one heavy battery, to proceed to the rear of that position. In the event, it proved to be a most fortuitous request. Many battalions of Poles actually forced their way into the Great Redoubt. Though the attack was driven off, the defending batteries were roughly handled and required relief. It was fortunate indeed that our reserve artillery brigade was, by that time, resting behind our fortifications, into which they were able to deploy.

Our next position, south of the Great Redoubt, was the hill of Semenofskaya and the flechettes constructed there upon. This position was very ably defended, though local commanders seemed to lack confidence in their ability to hold it. They requested artillery from the army reserve early in the morning. A request I refused. My confidence in the ability of the troops and commanders upon this ground was fully justified. While receiving no reinforcements from the army artillery reserve, they managed to hold their ground to the point of actually launching limited counter attacks. Their courage and success upon the battlefield can be nothing less than an inspiration to us all.

South of the Flechettes, in the northern Utitsa woods, a single division, the commander of which is unknown to me, defended their ground throughout the day. I can not praise these troops and their officers highly enough. Despite constant bombardment and repeated heavy assaults, they held their ground. Sadly, the rest of our forces on the far southern flank did not fair so well.

Late in the morning, having disposed of our northern reserve artillery brigades, I positioned myself behind our southern defenses. Being heavily assaulted by forces of French Marshal Davout, our commanders in this area requested the forward deployment of heavy batteries from the reserve. I considered their position to be untenable and refused to do so.

My caution was subsequently justified when Marshal Davout revealed his true intentions, much to our discomfiture. Shortly after noon, several divisions of infantry supported by cavalry and a considerable force of artillery emerged from the woods behind our southern flank. Positioning the available heavy batteries on a rise behind the town and woods of Utitsa, I called forward additional foot batteries and the five batteries of horse artillery reserve available to me. All foot batteries and two horse batteries were used to construct a line of defense, hinged upon the hill top.

Behind this line of 84 guns our forces attempted to regroup. Unfortunately, many of our battalions and regiments were intercepted by the flanking forces even as they attempted to disengage from the enemy to their front.

Anticipating that the first line of guns might not be able to withstand the coming assault, I formed a second line consisting of the three remaining horse batteries, with gaps to be filled by any guns that could be salvaged from the first line. Within an hour of forming these two defensive lines, the blow fell. On the left, two regiments of enemy cavalry overran a light battery, but were then repulsed by cavalry under the command of General Korff. This repulse had the effect of stabilizing the left flank.

But then disaster struck atop the hill. An attempt to forestall an infantry attack, that was obviously developing in front of the hinge in our line, was badly mishandled by General Korff. It is difficult to fully understand the actions of General Korff at this point, however, I had noticed previous actions on his part that defied logic. It is my belief that General Korff must have suffered a wound early in the battle, but through love of country and devotion to our cause, had refused to abandon his troops.

The French took full advantage of our mistake, and fell heavily upon the battery that was our keystone. I was located directly with the battery when the attack struck home. Though our gunners fought bravely, serving their guns until struck down by the bayonets of French infantry, it was not humanly possible to turn back an assault by three determined battalions. I narrowly escaped with my life, as did a scant fifteen gunners. The adjacent heavy battery was unwilling to face the same fate, and fled their guns.

Seeing that the first line had been shattered beyond repair, I ordered two batteries of horse guns to withdraw from the first line to the second. These batteries managed to extricate themselves and take their places in the second line, with French cavalry close on their heals. Prompt intervention by a fresh regiment of our dragoons temporarily halted the cavalry pursuit of our guns.

Seeing that I could do no more at that point, I turned my attention to the far southern flank. As I stated above, a battery on our far left had been destroyed by enemy cavalry. The adjacent foot battery, not wanting to share the same fate, limbered and began to withdraw. At another time, this might have been considered an act of cowardice in the face of the enemy.

On this occasion, however, their action was exactly correct. I rode over to the battery, intending to indicate the position they should take in the second line. The battery commander apparently misunderstood my intention and proceed to unlimber his battery in place. I assured him that I approved heartily of his actions in attempting to preserve his guns and that I strongly desired him to withdraw his battery to the second line. The battery was, by this time, hopelessly confused. Partially limbered, partially loaded, fatigued, and frightened, I feared it would be overrun long before it could be sorted out.

At this moment, our left wing commander arrived on the scene. I requested that he finish extricating the battery while I returned to the center, where survivors of another battery were attempting to flee to the rear. From my position in the center I could observe that many things were beginning to go right. Our second line now consisted of sixty light guns with several battalions of infantry in close support. One and a half additional batteries of light guns were joining the line. Several regiments of fresh cavalry were deploying behind the guns.

Some regiments of enemy cavalry that had been picking their way through the Utitsa woods were repulsed. It is my opinion that confidence, which had apparently been shattered, was beginning to return to the army. It was at this time that the action began to slow. Enemy divisions took up defensive positions due, in my opinion, to their complete exhaustion. Our southern positions around Utitsa were irretrievably lost. However, as it was never the intention of our battle plan to hold them to the last, I do not consider this to be significant.

This concludes the report of my actions upon the battlefield of Borodino.

For God, The Czar, and Holy Mother Russia,
I have the honor to be
Your most humble servant

Count Alexander Ivanovich Kutaisov
(Donald F. Hawker)