AAR 10

From: Vasil'Chikov, 12th Division, VII Army Corps (Bob Mulligan)

I do not play Napoleonics nor 25 mm, but I knew I wanted to play in Borodino '02. As a veteran of Gettysburg '00 I had been impressed at the size of the game, the difficulties inherent in cooperating and coordinating with such a large number of players/generals, and finally, I wanted to see how I measured up against other experienced players in such a tightly controlled environment. I had won the Bent Bayonet Award at Gettysburg; perhaps I could be a big winner at Borodino.

I did not respond to any of the pre-game blather on the Internet. Having played a dozen Carnage & Glory games in the past, I knew that any points of dispute would be settled by the umpire. In any event, the computer program can only allow so much leeway. Besides, I was a mere division commander, and would do what the Corps Commander ordered. My attitude was that of the subaltern in the WWI Punch Magazine cartoon. Standing in a watery trench, he is asked by a visiting "Colonel Blimp:" "What is your defensive plan for this position?" The Subaltern's reply: "To stay here and fight like Hell."

But I do agree with Prince Kutusoff who said in one of his eMails, that talking it up and "bonding" before the game would help to make you known to other players, and MIGHT get you some reinforcements when you needed them, as a result. Good advice.

I was pleased when I learned I would be stationed in an advanced position around the town of Borodino. This seemed to indicate immediate action with the French. (In Gettysburg, I waited from Friday to Saturday to get into action.) But, when I learned that I was to be stationed on the wrong side of the river (that is, in the town of Borodino itself) I thought I might have too much excitement too soon. I was right.

My Mission was to serve as a delaying force by holding the good defensive terrain within the town and causing casualties (AND fatigue.) Raevsky's VIIth Corps was to defend C4 and the Northern Road to Moscow. I discovered upon seeing the table, that with eight battalions holding the town, and two in reserve across the river and holding the bridge there, I did not have anywhere near the troops needed to defend the line of earthworks to the north of town. Raevsky and I agreed immediately to abandon these, and to put two regiments: 682-3 Alexopol and 684-5 New Ingermanland under Generalmajor Rylief within the town, and another, 678-9 Smolensk under Generalmajor Pantzerbieter within a cemetery on the southern edge of town. The 1/6 Jagers were sent west on the Moscow Road, to give early warning of the French approach. 2/6JR was posted within the cemetery in support. 680-1 Narva was posted across the Kalocha in reserve, and to support the guns.

With dawn, the enemy acted as I expected them to. Large numbers of infantry moved across my front from south to north, while a second force prepared to assault the cemetery. No less than seven batteries deployed on a slight ridge to my front, just to the west of town.

Throughout the game I was distressed by the lack of artillery under my own command. I have no reason to complain about lack of artillery support from Corps, for presumably they did their job. (Raevsky and I had agreed beforehand that the proper role of artillery was to shoot at massed infantry, within medium range or less, and then only to fire at 100%.) But the psychological effects of not having the inherent support of SOME guns was certainly distressing.

I am reminded of Hancock's order to his batteries to fire away during the pre-Pickett's Charge bombardment. Tactically it was the wrong thing to do, depleting his ammunition and tiring his gunners. But psychologically it was the right thing to do, as it let the sheltering infantry know that they were not totally helpless.

Soon two batteries were positioned near the banks of the Kalocha with good fields of fire in our support. North of the New Moscow Road was 677 Light Battery #47 (6 pdr Mediums) of our division, and 670 Position Battery #26 (12 pdr Mediums) from Schoulmann's Brigade, 2nd Army Artillery Reserve, to the south of the road.

I also took care to send off numerous written sighting reports to higher headquarters; timed and placed messages giving new developments as I noticed them. (Not that I noticed everything: sometimes I would realize that a new battery or brigade had been in place for a move or two, before it registered on my mind, and I got the news onto paper. Poor staff work, here!) But I continued to send messages as appropriate, throughout the game. As an aside, I got NO messages in return. (Well, I never approached a moment of crisis, so I suppose HQ had other things to do than send me messages.)

One message I remember, was to try to identify the units opposing me by describing the coats of one of the regiments: RED! I hardly thought I was opposed by British troops, but it turned out the brown coats of the Portuguese Legion had a lot of red in the brown, and in the uncertain morning light, the coats certainly did look red. By the way, these were plucky fellows, making several attacks on the town, and still holding their position at the end of the battle. Knowing that these soldiers, so far from home, would have low morale, I targeted them often hoping to send them routing. Our propaganda lied, as usual. Looking at the casualty returns, I see that in truth they did not suffer very much at all. I would certainly have said otherwise.

I planned to cower within the buildings and behind the cemetery walls, causing as much death and destruction as I could, but not to reinforce the village since, again, it was too forward a position. My mission was to delay not to hold, and it would have been suicide to move troops in column across the Kalocha stream over that narrow stone bridge.

The attackers did as they should have, attacking on a broad front with artillery support. C&G REALLY gives a defensive bonus to rested troops in cover, when they fire at close range. Even when firing from only two sides of a building (50% of a unit,) I was able to stop assaults several times, and repulse the attackers outside the walls if they did close to contact.

What then, happened? Because the troops crammed into the cemetery filled the available space so tightly, the commander of that brigade was touching the unit, and it appeared he was attached. Actually he was not, as Raevsky and I had agreed there was no point attaching officers unless a desperate situation required their presence to retake a position or hold a critical point. I had set the officer on the stone wall surrounding the cemetery. But jiggles on the table had caused him to slide forward into contact. On such little incidents do decisions of great magnitude depend!

For some reason, I was not present to oversee the exchange of fire. Probably because I was being attacked from two sides at once, and dealing with two opponents to my one. The Umpire (Tom Ballou) calling in the information, made the perfectly natural assumption that the officer was attached.

Boom! Crash! Alas poor Panzerbieter. A shell from one of the many batteries in support of the Poles attacking the cemetery knocked him from his horse, hit him in the elbow and severely wounded him. Of course, the battalion in reserve saw all, and their dismay soon communicated to the battalion manning the wall. The mistake was soon realized, but the information was in the computer! From now on, these troops would suffer a penalty on any morale roll.

Meantime. I was slowly losing houses within the village.

At midnight the game was called, and I went to bed, but not to sleep. In fact, not even to lie still! So intense had the four hours of fighting been; so important to the outcome the battle. (Well, from my perspective, I was the only guy in the whole room fighting!) There must have been some action o n my right, to the north of C4, but of that I was totally unaware.

I lay churning over plans for the morrow. Reinforce over the bridge? Insist that batteries be moved up to cover the area over which the enemy was attacking? Etc....

Next morning it was an easy hours work for the French to drive my troops from the village, some in rout, some in slightly more organized fashion. My remaining untouched Regiment (680-1 Narva) was in a good position on the opposite river bank, supported by two, later three Batteries, and backed by the Moscow Militia in entrenchments. I was able to take my routed troops to the top of the hill behind my lines, and gradually had the leisure to attach both myself and the remaining Brigadier (Palitzin of the Jagers) to rally them. And to wait for the onslaught, which had to succeed since I had but one Regiment and by now, three Batteries. But all was not roses and sunshine. The Moscow Militia disorganized INSIDE their entrenchments, WITHOUT BEING FIRED UPON!

The assault never came. The Poles marched off to a pointless death in front of the Great Redoubt. The French (or whoever they were) of Junot's Corps (?) settled into the village and gradually recovered from their exhaustion as I did.

For the rest of the game I did nothing. Wandered around, looked at the vendors wares, chatted up umpires etc. Waiting in ranks at Order Arms is very realistic, and I'm not complaining. Most units in such big battles stand around and wait, looking on while some other poor bastards get clobbered. And I certainly got my fill of action Thursday night. But still ......

Lessons learned:

In future games, those players who are not likely to see action should be sent to a reserve pool for reassignment. Certainly there was a lot of action on Friday and Saturday, and certainly there were several command slots not filled. To be fair to the organizers, there were lectures, (how come I never attended a one??) tours of the Fort (which I took) and several side games. I played Frank Chadwick's 54mm V&B game. Again, I am not complaining, but a "snatcher of bodies" might be appointed for future Jodiecons.

I had a good time. Thursday night was all the action I had hoped for. It was nice to meet new gamers. Rob Baron from California commanded the Poles attacking me. With him I felt an immediate kinship of age, interests, experience, etc. Also to meet and chat up Ahmet and Halise from Turkey, who sat at my table for one lunch. I went to the Episcopal services in the 1840's Garrison Chapel, and that made my wife Connie happy. I also chatted up Fred Hubig. I learned he grew up about 30 miles from where I live.

Most interesting was to see the dynamics of group interaction. The effects of fog of war, the group-think of outguessing what the enemy will do next, the pleading for or denying reinforcements, .... these you don't get in a basement facing your usual gaming opponents over a 4 foot by 8 foot battlefield. Jodiecon does something no club nor convention game can ever do: give a "real" battlefield perspective over a long period of time and over an entire large battlefield.

I am amazed that even tho' I wandered around for most of Friday and Saturday, I still have almost no idea of what happened on the other tables. The players were strangers, and they were BUSY. Not a whole lot of opportunity to kibitz.

Another and interesting lesson learned was insight gained about medals and honors. By 11 pm Thursday people were coming around to see the action in Borodino Village and saying: "Still holding the town? Gee, you're doing great!" And my little guys DID do well. But a funny thing happened. The Umpire was reassigned to another table for Friday and Saturday. No recommendation from him for the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael the Archangel. Next day the massive bloodletting of the Corps at the Great Redoubt and on the far southern flank attack so dwarfed my "battle of the brigades" that the courage and sacrifice of my lads, far from being a gallant and desperate defense of which the poets sing, proved to be no more than a speed bump on the road to Moscow.

My little guys DID do well. One jager and three infantry regiments of the 12th Division (ten battalions engaged of twelve) suffered 1102 casualties overall. For the entire division this was a 20% rate of loss, the third highest Division percentage of loss in the army. For the ten battalions engaged, it was a 30% loss.

12th Division loss was 8% of the total bayonets lost in the army. The Division of Bakhmetieff II suffered a 56% rate of loss or 16% of the army's bayonet loss; while Olsoufieff's Division suffered a rate of loss of 50% which was 16% of all bayonets. Vasil'chikov's Division suffered its loss in just five hours of play, or only a couple hours game time.

But a caution here. I don't know how other divisions suffered their losses. Was it by hard fighting, or cut down while fleeing? I've no idea. Working with Nigel's casualty printout and my calculator, I cannot help but reflect on Mark Twain's statement that "There are Lies, Damn Lies, ... and Statistics." A great American philosopher, that man!

Sunday morning I failed to persuade Raevsky to attack across the river to support Ahmet's Cossack attack, supported by Pahlen's cavalry. They were running amok behind the French lines. I'm sure we could have rolled up Ney's flank and perhaps even threatened the hill upon which Napoleon himself watched. I remember saying to Raevsky: "L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace!" But to no avail. He no doubt had his orders. And I had mine. "Hold the Kalocha." Once again, I am forced to confront my thrice dangerous belief that the most successful generals are those who disobey their orders.

I didn't get the Grand Cross of Saint Michael the Archangel, but then, neither did I get the Bent Bayonet award. And I'm anxious to learn what Jodiecon is going to do next!

Bob Mulligan, aka Vasil'Chikov commanding 12th Division, VII Army Corps